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EX-POST FEIST: APPLICATIONS OF A
LANDMARK COPYRIGHT DECISION
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.' ended a seventy year struggle
among federal circuits concerning copyright protection of factual
compilations.2 Prior to this decision, courts allowed copyright
protection for works if the compiler labored over his project,
whether or not the work involved originality or creativity. This
doctrine is known as the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious
collection" theory.8 Conversely, other courts espoused the "creative
selection" theory, which required an author to show a small amount
of creativity in order to receive copyright protection." The Feist
Court chose the latter course, thus mandating a creative require-
ment for compilations.
The holdings of Feist went beyond ending the split among the
circuits. In addition, the Supreme Court made three important
pronouncements: (1) the creativity requirement for copyright
protection is constitutionally mandated;5 (2) protection for a
compilation extends only to the portion of the work original to the
compiling author;" and (3) the sweat of the brow doctrine is
contrary to the letter and intent of copyright law.'
The Feist decision immediately created an uproar in the copy-
right industry. Although the Court firmly set out its doctrinal
position on the state of copyright law, many questions have
'499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991).
a A compilation is defined as:
A work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see infra note 13 and accompanying text.
a Courts subscribing to this theory included the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits; see
infra note 15 and accompanying text.
'The Second, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adhered to this doctrine; see infra note
16 and accompanying text.
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
6 499 U.S. at 348.
7 Id. at 353.
245
1
Meade: Ex-Post Feist: Application of  a Landmark Copyright Decision
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
remained about possible applications of the Feist teachings.s In
the two years following, several circuits have applied the ideologies
set forth by the Supreme Court and answered, in part, the concerns
of the early commentators.9
This Note will examine the applications and impact of Feist.
Part I outlines the history of pre-Feist decisions, highlighting the
split among circuits. Part II sets out the facts and analysis of the
Feist decision. Part III examines the applications of Feist. In
particular, this section focuses on: (1) the methods used to apply
the originality standard; (2) the practical effects of limiting
copyright protection to the original contributions; and (3) the courts'
adherence to the rejection of the sweat of the brow theory. Part IV
explores Feist's philosophical implications and their potential
applications.
PART I: LEGAL BACKGROUND
United States copyright law originates with the Copyright
Clause'0 of the Constitution and has been codified by federal
statute."1 Codification of the constitutional requirement that
' See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, No 'Sweat? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 338,339 (1992) ("[T]he Court
thus stripped away ... the copyright protection afforded a variety of information
products' ".); Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection
Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1375 (1991)
(questioning effectiveness of Feist decision in achieving its constitutional goals); L. Ray
Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Need for a Federal
Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 385, 385-86 (1992) (The Supreme
Court's unanimous decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. contains
an explicit lesson and an implicit warning. The lesson is that copyright law is overextended;
the warning is that the time has come to examine both the cause and the effect of the
overextension, and, by implication, to consider alternatives for protecting many works that
copyright now shields from competition.").
9 See supra note 8 regarding commentators' concerns. E.g., Kregos v. Associated Press,
937 F.2d 700, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (2d Cir. 1991); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp, 936
F.2d 851 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1219 (6th Cir. 1991),; BellSouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (11th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
'0 The Copyright clause states: 'Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
"l United States Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976); United States
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988).
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copyright protection advance and disseminate public knowledge has
not yielded consistently applied legal standards.12 This inconsis-
tency is due in part to the conflicting copyright principles that,
although there may be no protection for facts, compilations of facts
may be copyrightable.13 This paradox created confusion regarding
the scope of protection for factual compilations."' Courts in the
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits subscribed to the sweat of the
brow or industrious collection doctrine. These circuits advocated
that copyrights be granted and enforced for factual compilations if
the author exerted some identifiable effort in creating the work,
whether or not there was a creative element involved in the
compilation. 5 In contrast, the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits embraced the creative selection theory. This theory
required that a work must exhibit at least a modest amount of
creativity, regardless of the amount of effort put into compiling the
work, in order to receive copyright protection.16 This section
explores the legal history of these two approaches in turn.
• See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
= See William Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the 'White Pages Are
Not Copyrightable), 12 COMM. & L. 37, 37-47 (1990) (discussing contrasting approaches to
paradox).
14 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1991)
(discussing confusion created by 1909 Copyright Act that encouraged split among circuits in
granting copyright protection to factual compilations).
' See, e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 143 (7th
Cir. 1977) (holding that industrious collection merits copyright protection in compilations);
Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128,228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537
(8th Cir. 1985) (holding copyright protection is based upon efforts taken by phone company);
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
sufficient authorship where information collected for phone directory), rev'd, 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
16 Although the Second circuit produced the seminal case on the sweat of the brow theory,
Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922), it was later repudiated in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 715 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Miller v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365,212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 345 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
selection and arrangement must be original in order for protection to be extended under
copyright law); Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that copyright protection can be extended to the
original expression or arrangement of facts, not the facts themselves); Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 801, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 899
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding originality of directory to be dependent on creative selection,
organization and arrangement of preexisting facts).
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A. SWEAT OF THE BROW DOCTRINE
The sweat of the brow theory allows copyright protection for an
entire factual compilation based upon the cost, effort, and labor
invested in its creation. 17 Historically, supporters justified the
sweat of the brow theory on the grounds that it promoted public
policy by encouraging the dissemination of knowledge and the
development of new ideas."8 Adherents to this school of thought
believed that the sweat of the brow doctrine furthered these goals
by allowing the authors of factual compilations to reap the
economic benefits of their work through full control of the material
embodied in their production.1 9  This theory proposed that
anything less than full copyright protection would halt the
dissemination of information. Without such protection, a potential
author could wait until the basic work was completed and then
copy the material. Eventually, fewer authors would be willing to
compile facts at all.2
This doctrine stems from a fairness approach to copyright law
that evolved from English decisions interpreting the Statute of
Anne, Great Britain's copyright statute, which was the basis for
early American copyright acts."1 English courts applying the
Statute of Anne developed the principle that a second author may
not gain an advantage by taking a free ride on the labors of
another.' This doctrine first appeared in the United States as
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 665 (1984). Note that these two purposes tend to conflict because incentive through
total control of a work by the author prevents others from using public domain ideas and
information.
1 Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., 1st Ses., Copyright Law Revision Report: General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 6 (Comm. Print 1961).
' See generally Yen, supra note S, at 1345 (discussing development of sweat of the brow
theory).
2' See 8 Anne c. 19 (1710), preamble (stating that purpose of act is to discourage piracy
and is "for the encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books*); cf. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Note that the Copyright Clause of the Constitution parallels the
language in the Statute of Anne and American courts emphasize the similarity in underlying
purposes: to foster creation and disseminate knowledge.
See generally Patry, supra note 13, at 43-45 (discussing impact of English statutes and
cases on development of United States copyright law in factual compilations).
" Matthewson v. Stockdale, 12 Ves. Jun. 270, 33 Eng. Rep. 103 (ch. 1806); Lewis v.
Fullerton, 2 Beav. 6 (1839).
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early as 1845.2
American cases linked the doctrine with the requirement that the
work be original by asking "whether the production is the result of
independent labor or of copying."24 The Jeweler's Circular Pub-
lishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. 25 opinion, written by Judge
Learned Hand, is the seminal case outlining the sweat of the brow
theory. That case involved an infringement claim against a
directory publisher that copied listings from another publisher.
The court held that copyright protection does not depend upon
whether the information was in the public domain or created by the
author, but rather protection should be granted to anyone who
"produces by his labor" a compilation. 2 Circuits adhering to the
doctrine often adopt this court's rationale.27
B. CREATIVE SELECTION
The creative selection theory, on the other hand, limits copyright
protection to compilations which demonstrate some creativity in the
' Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436). One commentator
notes:
[s]ince our 1790 Copyright Act adopted virtually in toto the English
Statute of Anne, this should not be surprising. What is surprising is that
American courts in the 1980s continue to cite and rely on early nine-
teenth century English decisions, apparently unaware that those
decisions were based upon the exercise of general common law powers no
longer recognized in the U.S. federal courts and on a bareboned statute
(Anne) that is radically different from the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act.
Patry, supra note 13, at 44 n.23.
24 E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 208 (1879). The originality requirement in the
United States was first mandated by the interpretations of the words 'author' and writings
in the Constitution and the 1909 Copyright Act. The 1976 Copyright Act makes the
originality requirement explicit. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1865 (discussing
history of conflicting definitions of originality).
' 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
Id. at 88.
E.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Rockford Map
Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1025 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
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work's selection, coordination, or arrangement. 28 Further, where
the compilation meets this threshold creativity, the resulting
protection extends only to the original components of the compila-
tion and not to the work as a whole.' Unlike the industrious
collection theory, the creative selection doctrine embodies interpre-
tations of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
This theory first appeared in the early Supreme Court decisions:
The Trade-Mark Cases ° and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony.1 In The Trademark Cases, the Supreme Court interpret-
ed the Constitution to hold that originality is required for a work
to be considered a writing of an author. 2 The Court distinguished
the sweat of the brow rationale by stating that protectable writings
are those which are "the fruits of intellectual labor," or creativi-
ty.33
The Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles reiterated originality as a
requirement for protection. The Court explained that in order to
meet the originality requirement, there must be independent
conception plus a minimal amount of creativity.3 Taken together,
these cases remain the cornerstone for the creative selection
" See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). See generally M. &
D. NIMMr, NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT §3.04(B) (1994) (advocating creative selection test for
factual compilations). The language of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the basis for this
theory:
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801
(11th Cir. 1985) (applying creative selection test). Note that the disparity between the
circuits is for a narrow group of works, specifically, "low authorship" factual compilations.
The sweat theory encompasses a larger universe of works that it would deem copyrightable.
The creative selection would eliminate a few wholly unoriginal compilations from total
protection, and a much larger group would lose protection from partial copying where there
were facts that were not considered original components of the work.
80 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
3' 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
'2 The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
"Id. (emphasis added).
"Burrow-Gile, 111 U.S. at 58-60.
250
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approach.'
The Feist decision arose against this background of conflicting
views of copyright among the circuits. The Supreme Court's
decisive end to this controversy displayed a preference for the
creative selection approach, thereby sharply limiting the scope of
coverage given to works in those circuits which previously adhered
to the industrious collection doctrine.
PART II: THE FEIST CASE
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company,
Inc.,' the Supreme Court imposed a uniform approach to copy-
right protection of compilations. 7 The Feist company published
area-wide telephone directories.' The region covered by the Feist
directory at issue included the area that Rural Telephone had
serviced exclusively with a phone directory. 9 Both directories
contained white and yellow page sections, and they profited from
the sale of advertisements in the yellow page section.'4
Feist was unable to contract for the use of Rural's listings, so it
copied listings from Rural's directory."' Feist's employees exclud-
ed listings outside the scope of its directory and independently
verified and supplemented the listings copied from the Rural white
pages. 2 Some of Feist's listings, however, mirrored those in the
Rural directory, including four false entries designed to detect
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129 (1973),; Miller v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (th Cir. 1981); Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co.
827 F.2d 569,4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); see
generally L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (advocating
creative selection as constitutional requirement).
36 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
The Supreme Court did not choose to do so in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985).
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991).
3 Id. at 343. As a public utility, state regulations require Rural Telephone Service
Company to publish a directory of its subscribers.
4 Id. 342-43.
411 d. at 343. Feist tried to contract for the information in each of the eleven constituent
areas. However, Rural Telephone held out as the sole telephone company to refuse Feist a
license to use its information.
" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343-44 (1991).
1994]
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copying.'3 The district court granted summary judgment to Rural
Telephone on its copyright infringement claim based upon the
evidence of actual copying." In an unpublished opinion, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.' Subsequently,
the United States Supreme Court granted Feist's petition for
certiorari. 4"
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, thus ending the
seventy year split among circuits .4 The Court considered the
sweat of the brow and the creative selection doctrines, and opted in
favor of the latter. In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that
the Constitution mandated the creative selection approach.48
Further, the Court announced that only a taking of original
material infringes a compilation copyright, 9 and explicitly over-
ruled the sweat of the brow doctrine.'
The Feist Court emphasized originality as a constitutional
requirement for copyright protection.1 The Supreme Court
articulated this requirement as early as 1879.52 In The Trade-
mark Cases, the Court defined the constitutional term "writings" as
"only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers
of the mind.""3
" Id. 344. False entries are also considered in the Post-Feiat case of Nester's Map &
Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding false entries were not copyrightable because presented as factual data).
"Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
4" 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990).
46 498 U.S. 808 (1990).
,T Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
,Id. at 346-47; see also L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L REV.
719, 763 n.155 (1989) (announcing constitutional mandate for originality in copyrighted
works).
,9 Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.
50 Id. at 353-55.
81 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural TeL Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); see U.S.
CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to AUTHORS ... the exclusive Right to their
respective WRriINGSV) (emphasis added).
62 The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
53Id. at 94 (emphasis in original).
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The Feist Court took the constitutional mandate for originality
and further imposed a constitutional requirement for creativity."
The Court emphasized that the originality standard is twofold,
requiring "that the work was independently created by the author
(as opposed to copied from other works) and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity."'
Not only is creativity the intended requirement of the Constitu-
tion, but it is also intended by Congress.' Congress explicitly
included the creativity requirement by defining subjects of copy-
right protection as "original works of authorship.""7 The legisla-
tive history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that Congress
intended to explicitly codify existing criteria of protection: original-
ity and fixation." As a result, the Feist Court stood on a solid
constitutional and statutory foundation when it mandated a
minimal level of creativity for copyright protection.
From this foundation, the Court derived the standard for the
level of creativity required for copyright protection. Creativity
requires the "production of thought, and conception."59 In compar-
ison to this standard, novelty requires innovation. Although the
Court emphasized that creativity is a minimal standard, it will
preclude some compilations from protection.' In effect, this
threshold places "unoriginal"6' arrangements with other facts in
the public domain, and prevents their recapture through compila-
tion copyright.
At the outset, the Feist Court recognized the tension between the
proposition that facts do not warrant copyright protection, yet
" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991). Note the
importance of holding the creativity standard to be constitutionally mandated. The Supreme
Court effectively overruled years of precedent in industrious collection jurisdictions. Most
importantly, Congress cannot legislate around this decision by incorporating the sweat of the
brow doctrine into the copyright statute.
Id. at 345.
Id. 5-56 (discussing legislative history of 1976 Copyright Act).
s, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). The earlier copyright statute referred to wall the writings
of an author'. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
'a H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 51 (1976), cited with approval in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,362 (1991) (citing Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884)).
sId. at 361-62.61 d. at 363.
1994] 253
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compilations of facts generally do. 2 The idea/expression dichoto-
my explains how this tension may be resolved under copyright
law.' It is well established that copyright protection may not
extend to facts or ideas." It is rather the author's expression that
merits protection, whereas the underlying fact or idea, as public
domain material, may be freely exploited by all.' As the Feist
decision explained, there is a contrast between creative authorship
and the reproduction of facts:
[Flacts do not owe their origin to an act of author-
ship. The distinction is one between creation and
discovery: the first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has
merely discovered its existence."
Therefore, only the creative elements in a compilation merit
protection under the copyright statute.67
Citing the 1976 Copyright Act, the Court outlined selection,
arrangement, and coordination as elements that an author must
exhibit in order to merit copyright protection." This means that
even a compilation solely consisting of public domain data may be
copyrightable if the selection, coordination, or arrangement is
Id. at 344.
43 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
" This proposition was first announced in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). The
Copyright Act of 1976 states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
"See generally Patterson & Joyce, supra note 48, at 767; see also Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("[C]ommon sense tells us that 100
uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status when gathered together in one
place").
66 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 348.
'Id. at 356; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1993), supra note 28.
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original to the author." A compilation copyright however, pro-
tects only the original arrangement, and will not prevent a
subsequent compiler from using the underlying data."' Creative
selection emphasizes the public domain interest in ideas and
information, and encourages new authors to create by expanding
upon the raw ideas of others.71 Because the sweat of the brow
theory fails to recognize these copyright principles, the Court
explicitly repudiated it.
In rejecting the sweat of the brow theory, the Court noted that
this theory arose from a misinterpretation of the 1909 Copyright
Act. This Act, although drafted as a vehicle for the creative
selection doctrine, was not well articulated and led to confusion
among the lower courts.72 The Court noted that its cases decided
under the 1909 Act stated that copyright protection applied only to
an author's original contributions.7"
While acknowledging the fairness argument that circuits
adhering to the sweat of the brow doctrine often employed, the
Court stated that "t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate,
[ilt is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art.""' The exclusion of facts from copyright protec-
tion is designed to allow authors to rely upon and use facts and
other public domain information set out in earlier works.7
I Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural TeL Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 430, 348 (1991). It is
important to note that the terms selection, coordination, and arrangement are alternatives
under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Therefore, if any one of these elements are
original, the work may be protected. See Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in
Copyright Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 19 (1992) (discussing impact of this
requirement on past and future copyright decisions).
70 Feist, 499 U.S. at 359. This policy remains true to the constitutional goal of
disseminating knowledge by encouraging authors to find ways of assembling data that
readers may effectively use. Id. at 346.
n Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 355-56. The misunderstanding apparently arose from court interpretations of
the statute's list of categories under which an author may register her work. This list was
designed to aid the Registrar, however, courts interpreted the list, which enumerated
"compilations* to mean that all compilations were copyrightable and that protection extended
to the entire work. See Feist, 499 U.S. 352-53.
" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural TeL Serv. Co., 400 U.S. 340, 353 (1991) (citing
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)). Note, International News
did not arise under the copyright statute although copyright issues were present
74 Id. at 350.
75 Id. at 353.
1994] 255
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In applying these principles to the facts in the case, the Court
held that Feist Publications did not infringe the copyright held by
Rural Telephone. 76  The data contained in Rural's directory,
subscriber names and phone numbers, were uncopyrightable
facts.77 Further, the selection, coordination, and arrangement of
the white pages were insufficiently original to qualify for protec-
tion.78 In reaching this conclusion, the court characterized the
organization of the directory as "an age-old practice, firmly rooted
in tradition," "commonplace," "unoriginal," and "practically
inevitable."79 This holding implies that some methods of selection,
coordination, and arrangement are available in the public domain.
The realm of such possibilities, however, may be very narrow.'
PART III: APPLICATIONS OF FEIST
Courts applying Feist have generally followed its directives. They
have taken the holdings of Feist and elaborated upon the standards
to be utilized in applying the Supreme Court's doctrines.
Cases decided since Feist may be evaluated according to the three
mandates the Supreme Court announced in Feist. First, some
courts have established factors to consider in determining whether
minimal creativity exists, elaborating upon the constitutional
creativity requirement. Second, other cases have indicated that the
strongest impact of the Feist decision arises from the limited scope
of protection afforded compilations. For these courts, the emphasis
falls upon which portions of the work were copied, rather than
whether the work as a whole meets the low creativity threshold.
Third, some courts have attempted to evade the explicit repudiation
of the sweat of the brow doctrine by mislabeling industrious
collection as "creativity."
76 id. at 364.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) ("I[They existed
before Rural reported them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never published
a telephone directory").
" Id. at 362.
7Id. at 363.
' Note the Court's language: "Given that some works must fail, we cannot imagine a
more likely candidate. Indeed, were we to hold that Rural's white pages pass muster, it is
hard to believe that any collection of facts could fail." Id. at 364.
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL CREATIVITY REQUIREMENT
Courts applying the creativity requirement must look at each
work of authorship as a whole."' In factual compilations, creativi-
ty may be found in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of
the underlying data.' Any work displaying more than "garden-
variety," "typical," or "commonplace" organization principles meets
the minimal requirement. Courts may take into account indus-
try standards, triviality, functionality, and useful possibilities in
making the determination of originality."
The constitutional requirement of creativity stems from the
broader concept of originality.'M Originality demands two things:
original authorship and original expression.'M Original authorship
simply means that a work is not copied. Original expression is
creativity.8
7
In Kregos v. Associated Press," the Second Circuit emphasized
the distinction between authorship and creativity by implementing
a strict two-part test: (1) a determination of whether the work was
copied from another source; and (2) a determination of whether the
work contains a minimal amount of creativity.80 The panel
considered whether a baseball pitching form displayed sufficient
originality to merit copyright protection. In applying their two-part
test, the Second Circuit considered identical factors for each
analysis.' Practically speaking, examination of the creativity
8' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see supra note 2.
as 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see supra note 2.
u Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 672, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1226 (2d Cir. 1991); Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1296, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (N.D. IM, 1991); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704 (2d
Cir. 1991).
88 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991).
I1d. at 358.
'Id.
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991), 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161.
937 F.2d at 703-04. Other courts bypass the authorship requirement as a matter for
discussion. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999
F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991).
" Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704. The court considered such factors as total number of possible
arrangements, differences between Kregos' and other forms published in both the discussion
of independent creation and creativity.
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element alone would yield the same result as bifurcating the
originality test. It is not the element of original authorship that
adds to the dialogue of copyright protection. Rather, independent
creation is a well established requirement. Feist's contribution is
the constitutional mandate of the creativity requirement.91
The creativity requirement is not limited to judicial application.
In Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Oman,' the court held that the
Register of Copyrights did not abuse his discretion in citing a lack
of creativity as justification for denial of copyright.93 For this
reason, just as a certificate of registration merits a presumption of
validity, there is a parallel presumption of originality." The
Homer Laughlin decision further illustrates the use of the creativi-
ty prerequisite beyond factual compilations." Courts have applied
the Feist requirement to fabric design and sculpture."
Where factual compilations are concerned, however, the Copy-
right Act guides the examination into originality.' A compilation
results from original selection, coordination, or arrangement.98
These categories are alternatives and creativity in any one meets
" See generally Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331,
337-339 (1992) (discussing application of Feist by lower courts).
222 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074 (D.D.C. 1991).
"The Registrar stated: "overall authorship on each of these pieces of China is really a
familiar chinaware presentation which constitutes too minimal an amount of original creative
authorship to meet even the low standard'. Id. at 1075 (emphasis added).
"Runstadler Studios, Inc., v. MCM Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 (N.D. I1. 1991) (citing
Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 763, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
"Homer Laughlin, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1075 (applying creativity requirement to registration
of chinaware pattern).
" See, e.g., Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991)
(applying Feist test to floral textile pattern, finding no infringement); Runstadler Studios,
Inc., v. MCM Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. IMI. 1991) (using Feist requirements to deny
infringement claim involving glass spiral sculpture).
9 "A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 430 U.S. 340, 357 (1991) (discussing
statutory definition of compilation).
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the requirement."o A court's definitions of selection, coordination,
and arrangement prove to be critical in making determinations of
creativity in factual compilations. 10
In Feist, the Court defined selection as the scope of information
included in the Rural telephone directory.0 1 The Court held the
inclusion of the name, address, and phone listing of each subscriber
to the local telephone service was insufficiently creative to be
considered copyrightable selection.0 2  Post-Feist cases have
adhered to this definition of selection as the scope of coverage./°8
In Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple, Inc.,1°4 the court
denied original selection where the author of horse racing charts
failed to "exercise selectivity in what he report[ed]. 5 The chart
at issue contained numbers calculated from formulae used through-
out the industry to predict winning numbers in illegal "numbers
games." This selection, standard to all horse racing charts, failed
to meet the minimal creativity requirement. Another Second
Circuit panel offered a working definition of selection: "selection
implies the exercise of judgment in choosing which facts from a
given body of data to include in a compilation." "~c
' Feist and cases following have verified this reading of the statute; see Feist, 499 U.S.
at 362-63. See also Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding
original selection sufficient to merit copyright protection); BellSouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436,1441-42 (11th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994) (finding originality in coordination and arrangement alone
sufficient to support infringement claim).
Io The 1976 Copyright Act states: [t]he copyright in a compilation... does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material" 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The Feist Court
emphasized this idea and reiterated that existing facts or works are not to be considered in
determining whether the minimal creativity standard is met. 499 U.S. at 356-57.
'
1oFeist, 499 U.S. at 362.
'"Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
103 See, eg., Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1324,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (N.D.
Ohio 1992) (finding selection to be scope of data included in Medicaid table); Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding selection of baseball pitching form to
be universe of teams and pitchers). See generally Robert A. Gorman, The Feist Case:
Reflections on a Pathbreaking Copyright Decision, 18 RUTGERS COmPuTER & TECH. L.J. 731,
742-52 (1992) (outlining creativity test announced in Feist).
10, 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
106 936 F.2d at 673.
' Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 513, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1122 (2d Cir. 1991). Note that the Key Publications court defined creative
selection, where judgment is exercised the selection will pass muster. The Feist decision
implied that, first, selection must be identified, then, examined to determine creativity. The
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Coordination and arrangement have been less clearly defined.
The Feist Court groups the two together in its own analysis. 7
One commentator suggests that coordination is merely "linkage"
and arrangement is "sequencing principles.""l~ Several courts,
however, have taken Feist's lead and grouped together the catego-
ries of coordination and arrangement into a concept of organiza-
tion."°
In addition to defining these terms, courts have elaborated upon
practical aspects of the selection, coordination, and arrangement of
compilations in determining creativity. First, the selection,
coordination, and arrangement must be examined by looking at the
work in its entirety. The panel in Key Publications, Inc. v.
Chinatown Today Publishing,"0 considered the originality in a
directory for New York's Chinese-American community which
categorized businesses under headings similar to those in yellow
pages."' The court held that "individual categories chosen are
irrelevant to [the] inquiry [of originality].""1 2 Rather, the ques-
tion should be "whether the arrangement ... viewed in the
aggregate, is original.""3
court itself admitted that the selection of including only subscribers was 'selection' of a sort,
but it lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyright-
able expression*. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
1o1 499 U.S. at 363.
' See Gorman, supra note 103 at 752-55 (discussing application of creativity test to
compilation elements).
1I BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1443-44 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994); Key Publications Inc. v.
Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509,513-14 (2d Cir. 1991); Budish v. Gordon,
784 F. Supp. 1320, 1332-33 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
It should be noted that the Copyright Office sees the classifications in much the same way-
"'Arrangement' or 'coordination' refers to the ordering or grouping of data into lists or
categories.. .. Copyright Office, Guidelines for Registration of Fact-Based Compilations 1
(Rev. Oct. 11, 1989), cited in Patry, supra note 13, at 60.
110 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
"' Note that although some categories are similar to a typical yellow page directory, eg.,
"Accountants*, others are of particular interest to the community that the directory serves,
e.g., "Bean Curd & Bean Sprout Shops*. Id. at 514.
in Id.
in Id.; see also Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (overturning judgment for Register on basis that he failed to examine work
as a whole).
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Second, the Sixth Circuit in Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.1 4
held that the selection, coordination and arrangement must be
purposeful. 1 ' The work at issue was a grouping of five plastic
signs, which were displayed as a set, but neither sold nor packaged
together."' 6 The parties stipulated that individually the signs
were not copyrightable.'17 The court found no value in the
arrangement of the signs as a set and established purposefulness
as a threshold issue in examining a compilation for originality. 8
Finally, methods of factual discovery do not qualify as copyright
selection.11 The Kregos court developed a test applying this
principle:
[als long as selections of facts involve matters of
taste and personal opinion, [copyright protection is
justified]. ... However, where a selection of data is
the first step in an analysis that yields a precise
result or even a better-than-average probability of
some result, protecting the 'expression' of the selec-
tion would clearly risk protecting the idea of the
analysis."
The court applied the merger doctrine,'21 precluding a finding of
originality.
114 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991), 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1219.
lI 936 F.2d at 855.
I1 1d. at 852.
117 Id. at 854.
118 Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 51, 855 (6th Cir. 1991).
11 See BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999
F.2d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
'2 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
' The merger doctrine originated with the case, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103
(1879). The 1976 Copyright Act states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). The merger doctrine applies only where there is only a small,
limited number of ways to express an idea and granting copyright protection would unduly
prevent public use of the idea. 2 MELVILLE B. NMMR & DAVID NanMMR, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D], at 34-35 (1993).
2611994]
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Copyright law will not protect every selection, coordination, or
arrangement. "[T]o merit protection, the facts must be selected,
coordinated, or arranged 'in such a way' as to render the work as
a whole original."" Feist thus mandates a case by case analysis
of creativity. Although the study may be furthered by case
analogies, each situation should be viewed on its own merit.'
The Feist decision did not set out a test by which to judge
creativity, however. The Court used phrases such as "common-
place," "practically inevitable," and "garden-variety" to establish
negative guidelines.' A work that fails to meet these minimal
standards does not merit protection. In Kregos v. Associated
Press," the Second Circuit expanded the Feist directive; if a
work's creativity surpasses these minimal guidelines, it merits
copyright protection.1'2
Some courts have applied these negative phrases by determining
whether these terms could describe the works at issue.127 Dissat-
isfied with this criteria, courts developed other standards for
determining whether the minimal creativity standard has been
met, including industry standards, triviality and functionality.
The industry standard test works in conjunction with the
illustrative terms set forth in Feist."8 There is no creativity
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (citing Patry,
supra note 13, at 57 n.76).
' Id. at 357-59; see also CNN v. Video Monitoring Serve., 940 F.2d 1471, 1485 n.23, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991). Note that this case was
vacated on technical grounds. The Eleventh Circuits analysis in this case has not since been
contradicted.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63.
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
937 F.2d at 704; see also Abrams, supra note 68, at 24.
E.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that
motion and overall effect of "Breakout" computer game was not "mechanical," "garden-
variety," or "obvious'); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d
Cir. 1991) (finding horse-racing grids to be "purely functional" and, like arrangement in Feist,
unoriginal); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
baseball pitching form could not be subjectively described as "entirely typical," "garden-
variety," or "obvious").
' See, eg., BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc.,
999 F.2d 1436, 1443-44 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994) (holding that
industry standard is some evidence that Donnelley did not copy underlying original
elements).
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when a work is "typical" or "obvious" in a given field.' 29 For
example, in Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple, 8"° a horse
racing chart arranged with months on one axis and days of the
month on the other lacked creativity, because this organization was
the norm in the industry."1 Conversely, in Kregos v. Associated
Press,112 the court found that the baseball pitching form at issue,
distinctive from others previously published in the market,
displayed significant creativity both in the selection of statistics
and their grouping into useful headings.1'
Courts have taken a cue from Feist terminology and courts have
found originality where an author demonstrated more than a trivial
amount of creativity."3  In Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM
Ltd.," the .court found a glass spiral sculpture sufficiently
creative to merit copyright protection." Judge Moran stated,
"[t]he choice of location, orientation and dimensions of the glass
panes, and the degree of arc of the spiral, show far more than a
trivial amount of intellectual labor and artistic expression on
plaintiff's part."3
7
Post-Feist courts have been less consistent in applying functional-
ity to the study of originality. Generally, the more functional the
selection, coordination and arrangement, the less protection a
10 Note that this standard is not contrary to Feist, in which the telephone directory was
considered typical of other phone directories. Rather, it highlights and utilizes what was
merely implied by the Supreme Court.
13 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
3 936 F.2d at 673.
m 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
' Id. at 705.
m Courts have turned the Feist negative rule into a positive one. Justice O'Connor
wrote: '[t]here remains a narrow category of works in which the creative speak is utterly
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
3M 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. ]M. 1991).
768 F. Supp. at 1296.
Id. See also Kregos v. Associated Press, 973 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). Note that
for both cases this trivial standard is a quid pro quo. Just as the standard is low for
originality in the plaintiff's authorship, "if someone else displays the requisite creativity by
making a selection that differs in more than a trivial degree, [the plaintiff] cannot complain.*
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 710.
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compilation deserves.'" For example, the Second Circuit denied
protection where a horse racing form was a "purely functional grid"
offering "no opportunity for variation.' 3 9 On the other hand, a
fabric design received protection where the court held that the
choices the author made in designing the pattern were artistic and
not contrived for manufacturing ease. 14
0
Courts factor the total number of possible arrangements in
determining creativity as well. In Kregos v. Associated Press,'4
a baseball pitching form displayed nine categories of statistics. The
court stated:
there are at least scores of available statistics about
pitching performance available to be calculated from
the underlying data and therefore thousands of
combinations of data that a selector can choose to
include in a pitching form. It cannot be said as a
matter of law that in selecting the nine items for his
pitching form out of the universe of available data,
Kregos has failed to display enough selectivity to
satisfy the requirement of originality.1 2
Although helpful, this analysis should be qualified. The Feist
decision explicitly required that the consideration of alternative
outcomes be limited to useful arrangements.1 An Eleventh
Circuit panel reiterated this point: "[t]he relevant inquiry is not
whether there is some imaginable, although manifestly less useful,
method of arranging business telephone listings."'" Careful
application should thus factor an author's choice among meaningful
possibilities into whether creativity exists.
See generally Comment, From Facts to Form: Extension and Application of the Feist
"Practical Inevitability" Test and Creativity Standard, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 549, 553
(1992) (discussing practical applications of Feist criteria).
Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991).
Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991).
141 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
la Id. at 704. It is interesting to note that the court calculated the possibilities if Kregos
had used a universe of only 20 items-167,960 combinations.43 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-63, (1991).
144 BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
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B. LIMITED SCOPE OF PROTECTION
Even when a work meets the minimal creativity requirement, the
plaintiff must prove "copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original."14'5 Post-Feist courts have followed this man-
date with two notable effects. First, this rule has opened the door
for defendants to present a "creativity defense."'" Second, the
narrowing of copyright protection that concerned early commenta-
tors147 has occurred under this requirement rather than under
the minimal creativity standard.
148
Like the creativity requirement, courts following Feist refined the
limited protection standard to allow for easier application. The
Eleventh Circuit established a two part-test similar to that
introduced by Feist:"4 9 (1) identification of the original elements
of a work (selection, coordination and arrangement); s and (2)
examination of which elements of the work were taken with each
act of copying.151 A court should find infringement only where
the original elements were copied.152 This principle is reiterated
in Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterpris-
es," which held that substantial similarity must be shown
"between those elements, and only those elements, that provide
copyrightability to the allegedly infringed compilation."11
4
The Second Circuit in Kregos v. Associated Press' focused on
the limited protection principle, mandated by Feist, as an infringe-
ment defense, rather than an infringement test. The baseball
'
6 Feist, 499 U.S. at 361 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 648, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985)).11 See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes S and 9 and accompanying text.
148 ee infra note 159 and accompanying text.
" BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
uo Id. at 1445.
"Id. at 1440.
Id. at 1445.
945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 514. The court considered two telephone directories serving the Chinese-
American community of New York City. The Second Circuit emphasized that the deciding
factor was whether the organizing principle for the directories was similar, not whether the
competing publications contained the same information.
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
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pitching forms at issue in that case illustrate the thin protection
afforded compilations, as well as the duality of the creativity
requirement. The panel held:
[the plaintiff] cannot have it both ways. If his
decision to select ... statistics ... in combination
with his other selections, [is] enough creativity to
merit copyright protection, then a competitor's
decision to select in that same category performance
statistics... may well insulate the competitor from
a claim of infringement.'"
This emphasizes the potential for an affirmative defense to an
infringement claim based on the defendant's work meeting the
creativity requirement.
The infringement test, rather than the creativity requirement,
marked the change in copyright protection following the Feist
decision. Several cases found minimal creativity but no infringe-
ment where the creative elements were not copied.'57 For exam-
ple, in BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publishing, 8 the court found no infringement of the
creative arrangement of a yellow page directory where the defen-
dant did not copy "text or graphic material from the advertise-
ments, ... positioning of these advertisements, ... or textual
material."15 " Similarly, the Second Circuit held that a fabric
design did not infringe by a similar design of hand-sketched roses
when the drawings of those roses were not copied." ° Even courts
finding no creativity have pointed out that if originality had been
Id. at 710.
See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding no
infringement where first pitching form was creative, but second form duplicated only six of
nine categories and added its own original contributions); Key Publications, Inc. v.
Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding no
infringement by minimally creative business directory where only seventeen percent of
second work was derived from first).
999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
Id. at 1445.
160 Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991).
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met, the limited scope of protection would have precluded recov-
ery.161
C. REPUDIATION OF THE SWEAT OF THE BROW DOCTRINE
In applying the principles enumerated in Feist, courts have
generally been true to the repudiation of the sweat of the brow
doctrine. However, some courts have used language associated
with industrious collection to justify creativity in some works,
thereby circumventing the Supreme Court's explicit renunciation
of the doctrine. 62
Most courts, however, have abided by the Court's teachings as
well as its tests. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit in Cable News
Network v. Video Monitoring Services, expounded upon the
philosophical difference between the creative selection and sweat
of the brow theories.
Despite the Supreme Court's dictate, the industrious collection
doctrine seems to have reappeared in several post-Feist deci-
sions."' Courts that fail to follow the Supreme Court's guidelines
may produce analytical results which arguably recreate the sweat
of the brow doctrine. Justifying its finding of originality in state
tariff summaries, the Fourth Circuit stated:
The evidence suggests that ... Payphone expended
a great deal of time creating the single-page-per-
state format. The Guide, according to Payphone, is
the result of hundreds of hours of reviewing, analyz-
"E.g., CNN v. Video Monitoring Servo., 940 F.2d 1471,1485 (11th Cir. 1991) (restating
Feist requirement that only original elements are to be granted protection); Sem-Torq, Inc.
v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that elements copied do not consist
of original selection, coordination or arrangement).
SE.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 142, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding that laborious collection is selection element); U.S. Payphone, Inc.
v. Executives Unlimited, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding selection,
coordination and arrangement in research of data).
'a 940 F.2d 1471, vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991). Note that this case was
vacated on technical grounds. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in this case has not since been
contradicted.
' E.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 140 (5th Cir. 1992); U.S.
Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049, 2050 (4th Cir. 1991).
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ing and interpreting state tariffs and regula-
tions.' 6
The court in Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc.,'" used similar
reasoning, holding that creativity in constructing maps arose from
verifying preexisting maps generated by the United States
Geological Survey."" Thus, several courts previously adhering to
the sweat of the brow theory have avoided the holding of Feist
simply by labeling industrious collection as originality.
By overturning sweat of the brow, the Supreme Court reempha-
sized that the primary benefactor of copyright laws is the public,O
and benefits to the author are secondary."e  The industrious
collection perspective misplaced these priorities. In particular,
where factual compilations are concerned, adherence to sweat of the
brow risked protecting facts and data which copyright law was not
intended to cover. 16
The Eleventh Circuit, considering a preliminary injunction,
applied Feist through a discussion and analysis of the repudiation
of the industrious collection standard and the principles underlying
that choice.17° The dispute in that case arose between CNN and
a monitoring service, VMS. VMS recorded and monitored network
programming in order to provide analysis to its customers,
including copyright owners of commercials, the Justice Department,
and CNN itself.17 1 The district court granted an injunction to
CNN which enjoined VMS "from copying or selling copies of any of
' U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049,2050 (4th Cir.
1991).
'G 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992).
'6 Id. at 136.
' See generally L Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 6-9 (1987) (discussing preference for public benefit in achievement of copyright
purposes). The Supreme Court articulated this proposition years prior to the Feist decision
in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156,186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1975)
(stating that goal of copyright law is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good").
See L Ray Patterson, Copyright and 'the exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL
PRop. L. 3 (1993) (discussing conflict between legislative purposes and judicial results in
copyright law).
170 CNN v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir.
1991).
"'Id. at 1474.
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CNN's programming, either in whole or in part."172
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and emphasized that the injunc-
tion would prevent copying of unprotectable facts and future works
whose copyrightability had yet to be determined.7 7 The court
focused on the repudiation of sweat of the brow as a preference for
a regulatory, rather than a proprietary, basis for copyright
protection.' 74 The panel emphasized that by taking a regulatory
view, the Feist Court showed a preference for enhancing the public
domain over enriching the author's property rights.7" The
Eleventh Circuit implied that post-Feist injunctions should only be
granted where the restrictions extend only to clearly original
portions of compilations.
The repudiation of sweat of the brow prevents courts from
avoiding the underlying policy considerations of the Feist Court by
finding "creativity" based on labor. Further, this explicit edict by
the Court demonstrates a preference for dissemination of works
into the public domain over the extension of property rights for
authors. For the most part, decisions following Feist abide by the
policies and dictates of the Supreme Court. Courts have elaborated
upon the standards for creativity and have applied the tests
developed in the Feist case; however, some courts have strayed
from the letter of the Supreme Court's holdings. These courts
neglected to follow the explicit repudiation of the sweat of the brow
theory.
PART IV: BEYoND FEIST
Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services17 demon-
strates the ideological importance of the Feist decision. Most courts
have refined the literal applications of Feist for factual compila-
1 Id. at 1475.
'7 Id. at 1481. The circuit court further noted that CNN presented registration only of
one edition of its special programming "Crossfire.' Allowing this injunction would also be
protecting unregistered and unfixed material. Id
1
74 CNN v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478, vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir.
1991) (citing L Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5
(1987)).176 Id.
178 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991).
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tions. The impact of the Feist decision extends well beyond simply
stating a test for copyrightability of compilations. The Supreme
Court announced a philosophy of copyright priorities that extends
to all works of authorship. The purpose of copyright as set forth in
the Constitution is to promote learning.177 Copyright laws and
the courts must determine whether this purpose is to be furthered
by support for creation or dissemination of new works of author-
ship. 7 ' The Supreme Court, in Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken,'17 announced that the primary emphasis of copyright is
to enhance the public domain; benefits directly conferred upon
authors are secondary."is However, courts subsequently applying
copyright law have strayed from this ruling. In Feist, the court
reiterated this position and the major holdings of the decision
reflect this underlying philosophy.
Throughout United States copyright history, the statutory
guidelines have provided primarily for distribution with reward for
the author as a subsidiary concern. The courts, however, have
often focused on the statutory monopoly for the author at the
expense of encouraging public dissemination of new works.'8 ' By
declaring a constitutional mandate for creativity, the Supreme
Court ensures that the focus of the legislature will remain the
same. The Court further emphasized that the dictates of Feist
originated in the statute and legislative histories, illustrating the
policy position of Congress. 8 2
By limiting the scope of copyright to only those elements of a
work which are original to the author, the Court furthers the goal
of distribution by prohibiting recapture of the public domain."
'" The Constitution uses the phrase "To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts', U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, cl. 8. The term "science" has been read in its historical context
to mean "knowledge" or "learning". See Patterson, supra note 8, at 404.
17 For a general discussion of the competing views and overview, see Patterson, supra
note 168, at 2-13.
171 422 U.S. 151 (1975); see also, supra note 168 and accompanying text.
Id. at 156.
'
8 See generally Patterson, supra note 168 (contrasting legislative purposes and judicial
interpretations of copyright law).
lUFeist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355-58 (1991).
18 Id. at 359.
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Facts, ideas, and processes do not merit copyright protection.'"
By limiting the protection to the original contributions of an author,
the Supreme Court invalidates the concept of copyright as a
property right.1"
Finally, by renouncing the sweat of the brow theory, the Court
underscores its ideological stance. Sweat of the brow contradicts
the mandate of creativity and limited protection.'" One of the
Court's concerns was that the sweat of the brow doctrine ignores
the need for public access to factual works by granting to the
author a monopoly allowing recapture of public domain informa-
tion. Further, the Court was concerned that the monopoly created
allows a form of private censorship.""7
These ideological policies may lead to applications of this
landmark decision far outside the narrow boundaries of factual
compilations. The Supreme Court's emphasis on public dissemina-
tion over the author's property rights has possible applications in
all aspects of copyright law.
PART V: CONCLUSION
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. has proven to be
a landmark copyright decision. In Feist, the Supreme Court issued
three major holdings: (1) the Constitution mandates creativity as
a prerequisite for copyright protection; (2) such protection is limited
to only original elements of a work; and (3) the sweat of the brow
doctrine was repudiated.
The constitutional mandate for creativity is a threshold require-
ment for factual compilations and all works of authorship governed
by the copyright laws. However, it remains a low threshold which
any work exceeding the Feist criteria of practical inevitability and
obviousness can meet. In considering whether a work meets this
standard, industry norms and functionality may be considered.
' 499 U.S. at 353; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("In no case does copyright protection...
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.).
See Patterson, supra note S, at 88.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-54 (1991).
* Id. at 354; see also Patterson & Joyce, supra note 48, at 27.
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Infringement requires not only a valid copyright of a sufficiently
creative work, but also that the defendant copied those elements of
the work original to the copyright holder. This requirement has
narrowed the number of cases in which infringement is found. This
result prevents authors, especially of factual compilations, from
recapturing information in the public domain.
Finally, by explicitly repudiating the sweat of the brow doctrine,
the Court emphasized the role and purpose of copyright law. This
revocation prevents an author from bypassing the requirement set
forth in Feist by labeling effort as creativity. More importantly, by
holding that the sweat of the brow doctrine is contrary to copyright
policy, the Court established that the primary goal of copyright is
to distribute information to the public. Benefits to authors are
secondary. This policy can and should be utilized, not only for
factual compilations, but in all aspects of copyright law.
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CASE APPENDIX
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1933 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Atari challenged the Register's refusal to grant copyright to a
video game, "Breakout." The game consists of a multi-colored brick
wall, bouncing ball, and rectangle paddles. The Register based
refusal on the fact that the audio-visual work consisted of uncopy-
rightable geometric shapes. The court of appeals emphasized that
the Register is required to judge the work as a whole and found
that rejection of the application was unreasonable in light of Feist's
minimal creativity standard. The court held that the organization
of these underlying shapes was sufficient to merit a grant of
copyright. This was the second hearing of this case by the court of
appeals, the first, 888 F.2d 878 (1989), is often cited in textbooks
and commentaries.
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (11th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
In this action for infringement, the issues were whether a yellow
page directory met the minimal creativity requirement and, if so,
whether the second directory copied constituent original parts of
the first. The court held that there was minimal creativity in the
text, graphics and positioning of the individual advertisements, as
well as textual material designed to assist the user. However, the
court further found that the elements of the directory that were
copied, primarily the individual business listings, were not
sufficiently original to merit protection. The court, therefore, held
that there was no infringement.
Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241
(N.D. Ohio 1992).
The plaintiff wrote a book about Medicaid which included tables
that he created from information derived from a Governor's report.
The plaintiff's tables condensed the report's information into a more
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clear and readable format. The defendant admitted that he copied
the plaintiffs tables, but claimed that since the information
originated from a Governor's report, the tables consisted of public
domain facts and were, therefore, uncopyrightable. The court
agreed that the facts were not copyrightable but held that the
plaintiff's arrangement, selection and coordination deserved
copyright protection. By copying the tables, the defendant in-
fringed the plaintiffs copyright.
Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991).
The district court granted a preliminary injunction to the
plaintiff, a news broadcasting network. The injunction prohibited
copying or selling any portion of the network's broadcasts. The
defendant monitors television programs and provides statistical
data and copies of programming to its customers, which include
producers of commercials and broadcasting companies. On appeal,
the court examined the underlying policies of Feist and held that
the injunction was contrary to those teachings. The court revoked
the injunction on the basis that it protected future works which had
not been determined to merit copyright coverage. The panel stated
that the first priority of copyright is to encourage the distribution
of information, emphasizing the regulatory nature of copyright law.
The court stated that allowing this injunction would risk protecting
facts available in the public domain contrary to copyright policies.
Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Second Circuit applied the minimal creativity standard to a
fabric design. The plaintiff owned a copyright on a fabric design of
roses arranged on a background in horizontal rows. The defendant
admitted to modeling their fabric design upon one created by the
plaintiff; however, the graphic of the roses and arrangement of the
defendant's pattern differed from the plaintiff's. The court held
that the representation of roses and the arrangement of the roses
upon a background met the low threshold of creativity. However,
the panel found no infringement by the defendant because of the
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limited protection given to the design and the differences between
the two patterns.
Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Oman, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074
(D.D.C. 1991).
The district court held that the Register of Copyrights did not
abuse his discretion in denying copyright protection to a chinaware
pattern. The Register's office examined the plaintiff's application
on three occasions and concluded that the pattern lacked sufficient
creative authorship to merit protection. The court held that lack
of creativity is a proper reason to deny protection. The court
emphasized that determinations of creativity require informed
judgments and that deference should be given to the Register
regarding determinations on this issue.
Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc.,
945 F.2d 509, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1122 (2d Cir. 1991).
At issue in this case were two classified business directories
geared toward the Chinese-American community in New York City.
Both were similar in format to a typical yellow page directory;
however, each utilized headings directed toward the particular
audience, for example, "Bean Curd & Bean Sprout Shops". The
defendant's directory contained substantially fewer listings and
headings than the plaintiffs. The court stressed that the important
issue was whether the organizing principle guiding the selection for
the two publications was similar, not whether there was an overlap
in the information contained in the directories. The Second Circuit
held that the plaintiff's directory was subject to protection but that
the defendant's publication did not infringe that copyright.
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(2d Cir. 1991).
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for infringement
of a baseball pitching form. The plaintiff created a pitching form
listing nine categories of baseball statistics. The court held that
the plaintiff's form deserved copyright protection based upon the
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unique selection of statistics chosen compared with other published
pitching forms. However, the Second Circuit found that defendant's
form, which used six of the plaintiff's nine categories and added
four of its own, did not infringe the copyright. The court empha-
sized that the copyright given to the plaintiff's work rested solely
in the original selection, and protection would only cover infringe-
ment of that element.
Lipton v. Nature Co., 781 F. Supp. 1032,21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The plaintiff in this case authored a book containing seventy-six
terms relating to nature that served as the organizing principle of
the work. These terms were translated and selected based on the
plaintiff's knowledge of nature and Middle English. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant infringed his book by imprinting these
seventy-six terms on various products sold in their stores. The
district court found that the plaintiff's selection met the Feist
minimal creativity standard. The book was, therefore, held to be
copyrightable. The issue of infringement was reserved for trial.
Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1676 (5th Cir. 1992).
The plaintiff published maps based upon those of the United
States Geological Survey (USGS). In preparation, the plaintiff
researched, verified and updated the data contained in the USGS
maps. The Fifth Circuit held that these choices made by the
plaintiff constituted enough creativity to merit copyright protection
for the maps as factual compilations. The court held that, alterna-
tively, the maps were sufficiently creative to merit protection as a
pictorial and graphic work of authorship. The case was remanded
to determine whether the defendant's products infringed the
plaintiffs copyright.
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Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp.
729, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
This case involved two taxi drivers' guides to New York City
which contain mileage rates, public services, restaurants, and the
like. The plaintiff alleged infringement of its guide, in part, based
upon the copying of "false facts" contained within both books. The
court held that this information, represented as facts, could be
freely copied. The court reasoned that the purpose of copyright, to
disseminate information, would be restricted if facts could not be
copied without risk of violating a copyright. The defendant
admitted that portions of its guide were taken from the plaintiffs
work. The court applied Feist's requirement that infringement
occurs only with respect to those elements that are original.
Finding the portion of the plaintiff's guide entitled "streets most
useful to a taxi driver" to meet the creativity standard, the court
issued an injunction preventing the defendant from copying only
that segment of the book.
Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 1292, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
The plaintiff owned a valid copyright on a glass sculpture. The
defendant produced a spiral sculpture with general similarities to
that of the plaintiff's. The court established that, just as registra-
tion is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright, it is likewise
presumptive of originality. The court held that the presumption of
originality had not been rebutted in this case. However, the second
sculpture, although similar to the plaintiff's work, had a different
overall concept and feel. The court found no infringement.
Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1219 (6th Cir. 1991).
The plaintiff argued that five imprinted plastic signs, although
not individually copyrightable, could be protected as a compilation
when displayed as a set. The plaintiff sold and packaged the signs
individually. The court denied copyright protection stating that the
grouping did not provide function to the individual signs and,
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therefore, the products were evaluated separately.
U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2049 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Fourth Circuit held that there was sufficient originality in
a series of tariff summaries to merit copyright protection. The
court emphasized the plaintiff's time-consuming review, analysis
and interpretation of the data in preparation for publication. The
court failed to discuss the selection, coordination and arrangement
of the work. The panel held that the defendant, by -inadvertently
copying the summaries, infringed the copyright.
Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Second Circuit held that a horse-racing chart produced by
the plaintiff did not merit copyright protection; therefore, the
defendant did not infringe his work. The plaintiff's chart listed the
days of the month on one axis and the last thirteen months on the
other. This arrangement was standard to all horse-racing charts
and, therefore, failed to meet the minimal creativity requirement.
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